NEW TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CHALLENGES OF THE ECOLOGICAL AGE by Falk, Richard A.
122 
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Richard A. Falk 
I am glad to have this opportunity to 
talk about the future of international 
law, although I am mindful of the 
difficulty of dealing adequately with 
this subject within the limits of availahle 
time. The most I can hope to do here is 
to outline the general way in which I see 
the picture and hopr, you will trust that 
evidence and reasoning exists to support 
the conclusions. One of the things ahout 
the future, which is important to apprr,-
ciate is that ideological differences exist 
he tween different political systems at 
the present time, particularly the dif-
ference between the Communist and the 
Iiberal·demoeratic political systems. 
This difference wiII, in my judgment, 
have a diminishing effect on the deve"I-
opment of international law. I feel this 
is true not only brcause ideological 
perceptions of the world and of national 
interests seem to me to be of declining 
importance in the principal states of the 
world, but more f undamentlllly hrcam;l~ 
all nations are going to hc facllo in-
creasingly with a common seL of func-
tional prohlems which will indlJl:ll them 
to grasp the central role of coopllration 
in working out common responses to 
these problems. 
Even today differences in social, 
economic, technological, and geographi-
cal position seem much more important 
than diffl'renccs in idrology in thll 
i Jl ternational system. Disagreements 
about legal doctrine between thc 
poorer, developing countries and the 
rich, developed countries are likely to 
become very much more prominent in 
the years immediately ahead. These 
disagreements are likely to assume a 
variety of forms. The poorer countries 
will seek to limit the economic advan· 
tages that might accrue to the richer 
countries from unencumbered exploita-
tion of their technological advantages. 
One finds this already in relation to 
current discussions over how the 
mineral wealth of the oceans shall be 
trrated fmm a legal point of view. The 
more developed countries have tended 
to favor approaches allowing technologi-
cally advanced countries to derive the 
principal benefits. The poorer countries 
have either favored allowing the interna-
tional community as a whole to manage 
the process of exploiting ocean minerals 
and other resources, thereby deriving 
some of the revenue by having it divided 
among all countries of the world, or 
they have favored approaches allowing 
the extension of territorial sovereignty 
far to the seaward. This would give 
governments, regardless of their level of 
industrial development, much more of a 
role in authorizing and hl'nefiting from 
exploitation of offshore resources, 
whether it he fishing resources or 
mineral resources. 
These kinds of conflicts wiII also be 
reflected in increasing demands from 
the African, Asian, and Latin American 
states for revisions of the structure of 
international trade and for what 
amounts to a system of progressive 
taxation in world society. Under such 
an arrangement richer, high GNP coun-
tries will be expected, as a matter of 
obligation rather than as a matter of 
policy, to devote a fixed percentage of 
their national income to alleviate 
poverty and to facilitate economic 
development in the poorer countries. In 
this respect it is, I think, of some 
significance that the Teheran Declara-
tion of Human Rights in 196B, which is 
the most recent statement of aspiration 
in international affairs, imposes such an 
obligation on richer, developing coun-
tries, and that the revised Charter of the 
Organization of American States moves 
strongly in the direl'tion of imposing 
upon the United States an obligation to 
provide a certain amount of money, free 
from any control on the part of the 
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donor government, for the purposes of 
developing the poorer countries. 
These kinds of pressures for change 
in the governing legal structure of the 
world are quite predictable and, jn all 
probability, could he handled reltSOn-
ably successfully within the existing 
structure of international society. What 
is somewhat· doubtful is the ability of 
the existing structure to cope with the 
wider functional pressures that are 
building up in international society, 
pressures that continue to be only very 
dimly appreciated at the present time. 
In my judgment, these pressures arise 
from interconnected and cumulative 
threats that are beginning to imperil 
human survival and even to endanger 
the habitability of the planet as a whole. 
If regarded in the most optimistic pos-
sible way, they are likely to produce a 
steady deterioration in the quality of 
national and international life unless 
very meaningful responses occur very 
shortly. i\lankind is confronted, for the 
first time in human history, with a 
world-order crisis of planetary dimen-
sions. Our future depends, first of all, 
on whether the governments of princi-
pal national societies are able to or-
ganize themselves to meet these new 
kinds of problems. 
The four interrelated and cumulative 
threats are as follows: first, the con-
tinuing human tendency to resolve dis-
putes among groups by recourse to 
violence-and here [ mean to emphasize 
the central importance of the persis-
tence and pervasiveness of war as a 
human institution for as far ahead as we 
can see. There is nothing about the 
structure of international law which 
seems to offer any realistic prospect of 
effectively moderating the role of war 
except insofar as governments exercise 
rational and prudent self-restraint in the 
pursuit of their objectives and in the 
interests of their own survival. The 
second threat arises out of the growth 
of world population at a very alarming 
rate, both in terms of areas subjected to 
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particular population pressures and in 
relation to thc impact of the aggregate 
world population upon the carrying 
capacity of the earth's life support 
systems. There is now a growing body 
of evidence, for instance, Lhat when the 
world population reaehes the threshold 
of six or seven hillion, which it is 
expected to do in the last decade of the 
20th cenLury, there will be great pres-
sure on existing oxygen supplies: some 
marine biologists at the Univerf'ity of 
California have estimated thaL the maxi-
mum oxygen-carrying capacity of the 
world is 5.B billion. Whether they are 
correct or not is not really my point. 
My point is rather that the growing 
expectation of greater population places 
the whole basis of human exisLenee on 
the world and national level in jeopardy. 
The third threat seems to me to derive 
from the prospect of shortages of criti-
cal, renewable, and nonrenewablc re-
sources which will he bcginning to he 
felt by the end of the century. This will 
be accentuated to the extent that the 
poorer countries arc successful in 
achieving their goals of modernizing 
their own society, that is, by achieving 
industrial development of their own at a 
rapid rate. And, of course, the rising 
demands for production creatcd by an 
increasing population-which seeks an 
ever-higher "tandard of living-is the 
dynamic underpinning of the dangers 
that scem to me to derive from an 
ever-growing spiral of demands upon a 
fixed stock of resources. Fourth and 
finally, the pressures of technology on a 
scale more and more global in dimen-
sion arc causing a wide variety of 
environmental problems of widening 
scope. i\Iany of us arc familiar wiLh the 
fact that large bodies of water such as 
Lake Eric are virLually dead at Lhe 
present Lime as a consequence of long-
sustained poll u tion-long-sustained 
cUlllulative process of pollution that aL 
no point was thought Lo imperil the 
Great Lakes in the manner it now 
obviously has imperiled them-a peril 
Lhat turns out Lo 1)(' virtually irrever"ible 
once certain threshholds of deteriora-
tion have been crossed. There is a 
growing body of evidence which sug-
gests that the same dangers arc mount-
ing in reiaLion Lo the oceans of the 
world; an ever-rising number of Lhe 
mosL respeeLed oceanographers arc 
warning about the danger of irreversible 
catastrophes being caused by conLinuing 
present raLes of poilu Lion of Lht' oe('anl'>. 
And Lhis danger arises not only from 
poilu Ling the oeeans so LhaL fish and 
other living organisms :Ire put in jeop-
ardy, but also by eontaminaLing Lhe 
small marine micro-organisms under-
lying the whole process of phoLO-
synthesis responsible for the producLion 
of most of the world's oxygen supply. 
There is already evidence, for insLanee, 
Lhat the DDT eoneenLraLiom; in Lhe 
ocean arc impeding photosynLhesis in a 
way Lhat leads to decreases in the 
production of oxygen. 
These four kinds of threats seem verv 
serious at the present time and wiil 
become, almost assuredly, worse with 
each passing year. The longer we def('r 
any kind of acknowledgment of their 
existence and their importance. the 
more difficult it will he to take con-
structive and rectifying aetion in a 
noncatastrophic way. A L thh:; point in 
my prcsen tation, it lIIay app(~ar that my 
remarks have little, or nOLhing aL all, to 
do with international law. 
International law is hound to he 
influenced by the endangered planet 
situation, in part because thc hasic lrgal 
doctrine and political instit\ltion~ arc 
incapable of coming to terms with these 
emerging threats. The basic allocation of 
legal authoriLy in world society is ba~ed 
on two overriding principlcs. The firsL 
principle is based on idcas of ownership 
of real property-the principle that land 
and water within land entrusts national 
{!:overnments with virtually eX('lu:;iv() 
authority to gOYl'rn their o'~n·t('rrit()ries 
in accordance with their own policies. 
The second principle is based on ideas 
of freedoJll-the principle of freedoJll of 
the ocean!' and freedom of outer space 
which e~sentially supposes that all bene-
ficial uses may be made without the 
need for a paLlern of common regula-
tion since one is dealing with an arena 
of such abundance that there is no need 
to allocate authority among govern-
ments. Perhaps the simplest way to 
dramatize the iII-suitedness of these two 
principles is to borrow Garrett Hardin's 
illustration of the historical experience 
of overgrazing the English commons in 
the 18th and 19th centuries. 
In English country towns the pas-
tureland was held in common among 
the farmers who resided in the towns, 
and they could graze their cattle as they 
saw fit on thc common pasturcland. The 
idca of a common pasture parallels the 
idea of freedom of the ocean. In the 
18th and 19th centuries, increases in the 
animal population on these pastures 
gradually came to place pressure on 
their carrying capacity. A condition of 
abundance was converted into one of 
scarcity. Also, on the commons, private 
ownership of the animals was combined 
with public ownership of the grazing 
land. The essenLial clement in what 
Hardin calls the tragedy of the com-
mons is a consequence of the combina-
tion of privatl~ and public ownership 
becoming highly unstable and disruptive 
in a situation of growing scarcity. Even 
in conditions of scarcity each farmer 
had a grcatcr incentive to increase the 
size of his own herd rathcr than to 
cxcrcise self-rcstraint to promote an 
idea of limitation based on community 
welfare-an aggregate figure for the 
separate herds. I L is not surprising that 
farmers continued to increase the size of 
their herds and that English pasturcland 
was eventually destroyed. The logic 
leading up to this end is what has bcen 
called the tragcdy of the commons: the 
drive hy farJl1l)rs for maximum nwcnuc 
hasl~d on maximum herds collided with 
the public interest in maintaining 
limited herds so that the pastureland 
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could sustain its aggregate animal popu-
lation. 
International society is entering into 
a comparable phase in its development. 
We are living now in the early years of 
what 1 have labeled as the Ecological 
Age. The Torrey Canyon oil spill can be 
considered the Hiroshima of the Eco-
logical Age and the Santa Barbara blow-
outs the Nagasaki. These occurrences 
are the early warning signals, in effect, 
of the impending inability of the per-
missive system by which the oceans arc 
used to cope with the kinds of problems 
being created by modern technology. 
The Torrey Canyon incident was, in 
part, caused by the desire to cut op-
erating costs by registering an unsea-
worthy oil tanker in a state with liheral 
registration standards. Such a sub-
standard registry conflicted with the 
public interest in maintaining the purity 
of the oceans. Furthermore, in this 
setting, the results were aggravated by 
ecological ignorance-the oil pollution 
really caused less damage than did the 
efforts to disperse the oil through the 
usc of chemical detergents. These deter-
gents did a considerable amount of 
seemingly permanenL damage to marine 
life in the area most immediately af-
fected. 
The challenge is aggravated by the 
fact that international socicly has ex-
perienced two major transformations in 
a very shorL historical interval: Lhe first 
transformation was brought about by 
the development of nuclear weapons 
and the initiation of the nuclear age, 
which can be conveniently associated 
with the Hiroshima atomic explosion in 
1945. The second major transformation 
can be associated with the year 
1967-the time of the Torrey Canyon 
disaster. Before 1945 international 
society had several centuries to absorb 
changes in technology, and even the 
initiation of the nuclear age had been 
preceded hy a eon!>ic.lerahle period of 
warning of difficulties to come. World 
War I and World War II provided strong 
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indications of the destructiveness of 
modern warfare and made many aware 
that war was an expensive and often 
self-destructive way of resolving ('t'ntral 
conflicts in international society. 
Therefore, if one looks at the long 
sweep of international history, it be-
comes clear that .from the period of 
1648 to 1914-from the Peace of West-
phalia to the outbreak of W orld War 
I-the period which the state system 
emerged and developed, thert' was a 
long buildup of attitudes and modes of 
coordinating behavior which seemed to 
correspond to the basic requirements of 
a tolerable social and political existcnce. 
And in that long prenuclear period, even 
the institution of war was not, by and 
large, an overly costly and destructive 
way of resolving conflicts and providing 
some method of change among con-
tending political forces within interna-
tional society. 
The basic allocation of authority 
between territorial sovereignty and free-
dom of use, community use, seemed to 
work out quite well. Most events were 
relatively local and could be territorially 
confined. The oceans were sufficiently 
ahundant to accommodate thc usc of 
all. World War I underscored the dangers 
of uncontrolled warfare as an instru-
ment of national discrt'tion. The II~gal 
efforts sinee World War I havt' hasically 
been an allempt to both moderate and 
prohibit the recourse to war under 
conditions where it is increasingly 
costly. As indicated at the outset, I am 
very skeptical about the significance of 
these legal efforts to eliminate war or 
even to alter greatly the role of war in 
international society. 
The evolution of nuelear weapons 
carried further the intensification of 
weapons of destruction and made very 
plain to all who were rational that 
catastrophic consequences would follow 
from lurge-scale nucIt'ar wurfare. In eOIl-
trust to the issues of the nucleur age, lhe 
problems emerging in relution to the 
Ecological Age are not yet understood 
as presenting ha-·ie challenges to the 
ways in which governments handle their 
affairs and coordinate their activities. 
The problem is, first of all, that the 
oceans are insufficient to satisfy all 
demands, that is, the tragt'dy of the 
commons problem heing played out on 
and beneath the high seas. There is also 
the related problem of the nonlocalness 
of domestic affairs as, increasingly, 
evcnts and policies enacted with tcrri-
tory have a bearing on the welfare of 
the world. If we take at all seriously the 
view, and I think we should, that the 
world has a limited carrying capacity in 
terms of world population, then what 
different national governments do with 
respect to population policy is very 
important to the welfare of all our 
national societies. I t is also of very great 
importance what governments do amI 
do not do on their territory with respect 
to nuclear testing or contamination of 
the atmosphere through radioactive ex-
plosions. The impacts of such a matler 
are ohviously not confint'd to the terri-
tory of the state making the decision to 
test these weapons, regardless of the 
locus of the event. 
One critical devt'lopment is that the 
poorer parts of the world arc ht'coming 
even more crowded. Most of these 
int'reases in population have two eharac-
t('ristics. First, they ,II'(: e()I1I!(~nlrated in 
the poorer countries in Asia, Africa, und 
Latin America; and second, these in-
creases are concentrated in citics-most 
of the net increase in world population 
between now and the year 2000 will he 
reflected in the growth of urban popula-
tion. Cities in conditions of poverty are 
the greatest source of world disease, and 
there are growing dangcrs of epidemics. 
Unsanitary urban conditions are likely 
to hecome even more dangerous in t1w 
decades ahead. We know that modern 
medicine has practil'ully no deft'lise 
against these outhreaks of contugious 
disease. For instanc(', the Asian flu that 
has swept around the world in recent 
years has not been dangerous to very 
many people. I-1owewe'r, there is no 
necessary n'ason, nH'dical or genetic, 
why the flu has becn n'lalively henign in 
the last few years. Epidemiologists pre-
dict that within the next few decades 
there wiII be a lethal strain of virus that 
wiII spread throughout the world. Many 
of these developmcnts point in the same 
direction, namely, that one can no 
longer expect the welfare of any part of 
the world to be upheld by even the 
most enlightenl'd of national ~ove~rn· 
ments. Imprudent governments may 
endanger the welfarl' of mankind hy 
acts undertaken within their territory. 
The obsolescence of the state system 
is obvious also in relation to the oceans. 
One serious problem is the impact of 
hard inseeticidcs on the quality of the 
oceans. It is evident that national policy 
and priorities hearing on choices such as 
whether to make agricultural produc-
tion more costly or less successful may 
have a considerable ecological signifi-
cam'e. Such choices hy principal govern-
ments might well determine whether the 
ol'eans can sustain the delicate ecologi-
cal halance. A decision reached by a 
govrrnment as to whether or not to 
prohibit DDT is not only of nationnl 
significance hut, increasingly as well, of 
world significance. Thus, in terms of 
thinking about the capacity of the 
international legal order to cope with 
the problems of the future, we are 
confronted with a very dangerous situa-
tion in which the basic attitudes of 
self-reliance that have guided national 
governments for several centuries seem 
inadequate to cope with the emerging 
problems of an endangered planet. 
These basic attitudes have grown up in a 
world situation in which separate states 
were essentially meaningful units of 
political Iife. In early times the ideals of 
national sovereignty with respect to 
national territory really did represent a 
fairly rational allocation of govern-
mental authority, and governments 
could safeguard the welfare of their own 
societies by adopting more or less 
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enlightenrd policies and by being vigi-
lant about the protection of their inde-
pendence and territorial integrity. 
In the present se~lling then, if my 
general interpretation is generally cor-
rect, no matter how enlightened na-
tional governments are with respect to 
these four areas of threat, nothing these 
governments do alone is capable of 
assuring national welfare and of guaran-
teeing physical survival over any long-
term period. Similarly, competition 
among states using the oceans may 
jeopardize common interests in main-
taining and developing this extraordi-
nary resource of mankind. A great deal 
of evidence is beginning to he gathered 
that demonstrates the limited ability of 
present institutions to cope with the 
kinds of problems that arc characteristic 
of this early phase of the Ecological 
Age. 
The most dramatic inference from 
my presentation is that a world of 
sovereign statcs with traditions of com-
petitive rivalry is doomed to cxtinction. 
Such an inference may appear to he 
simplistic or apocalyptic, but it is the 
incvitahle outcome of the analysis. The 
challenges of the Ecologienl Age mId up 
to an adaptive challenge, which goes to 
the roots of human existence. The social 
and political institutions and supportive! 
vnlues we have are not, at the present 
time, eapahle of meeting this challenge. 
At the present, our political agenda is 
hadly outdated and obsolescent. Our 
political agenda and, therefore, the 
world-order prohlems that we try to 
deal with have been exclusively defined 
by the problems of man in society, of 
men in different societies having differ-
ent ends, human groups in collectivities 
competing and conflicting with one 
another, and, under certain circum-
stances of perceived interest, co-
operating with one another. This politi-
cal focus assumes that it is reasonable to 
take for granted the environment within 
which society and social and political 
affairs are conducted. So long as the 
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relations of men and nature can be 
takcn for granted, it follows that human 
society can expect to experience indefi-
nite expansion. The whole commitment 
to increasing the gross national product 
at the national and world level every 
year is an expression of belief in the 
essential limitlessness of man's existence 
on earth. The force of my argument is 
that we nCl'd to plan the institutional 
arrangements, the norms, and pro-
cedures for conducting human affairs 
within a limited environment. We need 
to accept, as best we can, the finiteness 
of man as a creature of the world and 
the finiteness of man's environment. A 
recently published book, Agenda for the 
Nation, published by the Brookings 
Institution to guide the transition from 
the Johnson administration to the 
Nixon administration, illustrates how 
out of step our most influential com-
mentators are with this new order of 
world problems. This book attempts to 
cover all the issues that should he on the 
agenda of the new administration. None 
of the articles is devoted to any aspect 
with which we have been concerned. 
The ecological hazards are, in other 
words, not part of the spretrum of 
political relevance that is perceived by 
our leading policymakers and decision-
makers. Part of this crisis of adaption is 
revealed !ly a failure of awareness, a 
failure reflected in the unwillingness to 
create a new agenda of political action, 
an agenda appropriate for an en-
dangered planet. 
In contrast to this sense of concern, 
there are some hopeful signs. For in-
stance, Presidcnt Nixon's address of 
1 %9 on population policy displayed an 
unprecedented awareness of the politi-
cal importance for the world and for the 
United States of curtailing the con-
tinuing population expansion expected 
by the end of the century. Patrick 
[\Ioynihan in a sprech to the NATO 
Council on 21 Octoher 1969 011 the 
creation of a Committee on the Chal-
lenges of Modern Society acknowledged 
the emerging ecological crisis as being 
the overshadowing issue of our times. 
Moynihan's specific assignment was to 
make the case for widening the role of 
NATO to include environmental proh-
lems. There is, thus, evidence that the 
U.S. Government is becoming aware of 
the importancl' of ccological challengl's 
to national well-being. But it is essential 
that a compar<lble awareness dev,·lop in 
other major societies of the world. The 
character of the problem is one that 
requires a coordination of effort among 
sovereign states. Such coordination can 
only take place if a common sense of 
the ecological crisis forms in different 
parts of the world during the same 
gcncral historical time. In this connec-
tion, one of the most important side 
benefits of the Apollo mission has been 
to present the world with visual images 
of the unity of the earth and, therefore, 
to foster recognition of the world as a 
reality of its own. This presentation of 
unity as the dominant image of global 
rcality corresponds closely to the re-
quirements for coordination of dfort 
on a functional level. Unless political 
perceptions begin to envision the world 
in terms of its functional unity, in thc 
same way that one sees the world from 
outer space, the prospects of evolving 
the kinds of approat:hes 11l'I'ded to lil'al 
with these common problems facing 
mankind seem virtually nil. 
l'Vly own feeling about the present 
situation is that the first urgent task 
that follows from the acceptance of an 
endangered planet argument is to revise 
the political agenda by putting Lhis new 
ecological category of problems into 
sufficient focus so that governmcnt offi-
cials begin to understand thal their own 
performance depends on developing re-
sponses to these challenges. In this vcin, 
thl' most urgent tasks before interna-
tional lawyers, in my judgment, are to 
try to clarify the governing standards 
and functional institutions that mighl 
be appropriate for an endangered planet 
and to direct an increasing amount of 
allcntion tc lrying to show, for in-
stancc, that matters of world population 
can no longer be entrusted exclusively 
or indcfinitely to the relative degrce of 
enli~htenment of diffl'rent national 
(!;overnments. We nerd, instead, a COIll-
mon world policy renl'cling differt'nccs 
in ideology, culture, religion, and ethical 
values. And this common policy must 
he evolved relatively rapidly for the 
henefit of all mankind. The demonstra-
tion of these functional pressures will 
itself help us to develop an awarene~s 
which may arouse constructive re-
sponses and will help governments to 
sec that an incrt'asing pcrcentage of the 
rt'ally serious problems facing them can-
not be dealt with by reliance in a 
sovereignty-centered, competitive sys-
tem of world society. We need to work 
toward a much more cooperative set of 
funeLional regimes-structures ahle to 
work cooperatively and to dt'al witli 
eommon interest:; in a wav which will 
protect the interests of ali memhers of 
the international community. Voluntary 
action on behalf of the world interest is 
not enough because of the contradic-
tory tensions bt~twern egocentric and 
community valucs-the tensions that 
produce the tragedy of the commons. It 
is not enough to point out that en-
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lightenmcnt is necI'!'sary for all; differ-
ent states have different interesLs and, 
therefore, different sets of priorities. In 
regard to these ecological problems. the 
interests of the less devrloped countries 
in maximizing development lead them 
in a direction oppo!'ite to that Laken by 
the more developed countriet" Lhat do 
not have to operate under the same kind 
of domestic pressure. Thus, one of the 
most imporLant adjustments to the cur-
rent inLernaLional setting would involve 
the recognition that the real differences 
in national priorities result from dif-
ferences in national position, and that 
differences need to be accommodatcd in 
new legal doctrine that purports to work 
for the I"ntire cOllllllnnity of staks, anti in 
the design of institutions appropriatc to 
dcal with these emerging ecological chal-
Icngcs. 
The final point I wish to make is that 
the traditional ideas of citizenship and 
loyalty. need to bc reconsidered in light of 
the imperatives of the Ecological Age. In 
particular, we nced to make people more 
sensitive to the increasing depl"ndcnce of 
all peoples on the exercise of a certain 
kind of global sanity. All society is now 
so in tt!rdependen t that it is no longer 
rationally possihle to contemplate going 
it alone in the international system. 
----tp----
